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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that “testimonial” statements are the core, perhaps exclusive, concern of 
the Confrontation Clause.1 The Court began a process of defining the 
testimonial-statement concept but did not develop a comprehensive 
definition. In Crawford, the Court found testimonial a statement that 
was tape recorded and obtained from a criminal suspect who was in 
police custody, had been given Miranda2 warnings, and was being 
interrogated by known governmental agents using what the Court 
termed “structured” questioning. One of the definitions the Court 
explicitly presented as a possible model was highly formal and 
formalistic, and the fact pattern in Crawford, as briefly described above, 
would have fit within such a restrictive and wooden formulation of the 
concept. 
I use the terms “formal” and “formalistic.” By “formal,” I mean a 
requirement about the physical form of the statement (written, recorded, 
etc.), which is at the heart of the definition proposed by Justice Thomas 
in White v. Illinois,3 or the formality of the proceedings where that 
statement was secured.4 “By formalistic, I mean [a relatively] wooden 
adherence to a set formula rather than a functional approach based on 
the protective purposes of the Confrontation Clause.”5 These two 
                                               
*  Harry R. Chadwick, Sr., Professor of Law, Duke Law School. I wish to thank 
Randy Jonakait, Rick Lempert, Roger Park, Jeff Powell and the participants at the Regent 
University Law Review Symposium—Crawford, Davis & the Right of Confrontation: 
Where Do We Go from Here?—for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1  541 U.S. 36, 50–52 (2004). 
2  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3  502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). In White, Justice Scalia joined 
Justice Thomas’s opinion, but in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), Justice 
Scalia showed that he did not strictly adhere to that definition, although Justice Thomas 
continued to do so as his dissent in that case showed. 
4  Among the problems with using this type of definition is that the coverage of the 
Confrontation Clause is subject to easy manipulation by the police to avoid such formality. 
See discussion infra pp. 343–44, 349–50. 
5  Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic 
Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 411 n.2 (2005) [hereinafter 
Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact] (stating, initially, a form of dual criticism of the potential 
inadequacy of “testimonial”); see also Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the 
Formalistic Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 
14 [hereinafter Mosteller, “Accusatorial” Fix] (arguing against formalism and instead for a 
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concepts are related but distinct: in my view, neither excessive formality 
nor formalism are demanded by Crawford, nor are they consistent with 
its basic intuition about the role of the Clause. 
In Davis v. Washington, the Court applied the Crawford 
testimonial-statement approach to two additional types of statements, 
one of which it found to be within the definition and the other outside it.6 
The Court again declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the 
concept, and it left a large number of questions unanswered about its 
dimensions. However, it did reject some of the most formal and 
formalistic elements of what was possible after Crawford. 
Davis gave us a somewhat softened definition for the testimonial-
statement concept. Specifically, its holding and the additional 
explanatory language of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the eight-justice 
majority, which was often in direct or implicit response to Justice 
Thomas’s dissent advocating adherence to formality, has softened the 
formality of the definition.7 Davis’s expanded coverage and the modest 
flexibility it allows in applying the professed definition has also had the 
effect of softening its formalism. Both developments are quite positive, 
but unfortunately the opinions leave it entirely unclear whether the 
Court will continue in this direction.  
These changes in the formality and formalism of the testimonial-
statement concept and their implications are the subject of this article. 
My analysis also leads to some further general observations. I question 
whether the term “testimonial” accurately describes the definition the 
Court is developing and whether that definition is as faithful to textual 
and originalist sources as Justice Scalia insists. 
II. THE OUTLINES OF THE COURT’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE TESTIMONIAL-
STATEMENT DEFINITION 
Justice Scalia began with history, which he found reflected a special 
concern: “[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly 
its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”8 He 
specifically cited two examples: first, the use of statements taken from 
accusers by the examining magistrates under the Marian Statutes in the 
sixteenth century;9 and second, the accusations of Lord Cobham against 
                                                                                                              
more functional definition that takes as its most important feature the core concern of 
whether certain witnesses were making criminal accusations against the defendant). 
6  126 S. Ct. at 2276–80. 
7  The Court, however, explicitly stated that the formality of a statement is a 
requirement of a testimonial statement: “We do not dispute that formality is indeed 
essential to testimonial utterance.” Id. at 2279 n.5. 
8  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
9  Id. at 44, 50. 
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Sir Walter Raleigh in his treason trial, who had directly implicated him 
in both an examination before the Privy Council and in a letter to it.10 
With respect to the dictionary and its insight into the meaning of 
the constitutional language used, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this focus. It applies to 
“witnesses” against the accused—in other words, those who “bear 
testimony.” “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” 
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not.11 
Without adopting any specific formulation, the Court quoted three 
possible definitions for “testimonial” statements: 
1. Petitioner’s Definition: “ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”12 
2. Justice Thomas’s Definition: “extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”13 
3. Amici’s Definition: “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”14 
Justice Scalia left for another day a comprehensive definition of such 
statements.15 In doing so, he acknowledged the merits of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s contention that the majority’s “refusal to articulate a 
comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty.”16 
Justice Scalia provided only a somewhat generalized version of the 
necessary implications of the fact pattern covered in Crawford, where he 
seemed to add to the Justice Thomas definition, the most restrictive of 
the three suggested definitions. 
Justice Scalia described the scope of the testimonial concept as 
follows: “[I]t applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
                                               
10  Id. at 44. 
11  Id. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 91 (New York, S. Converse 1828)). 
12  Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02–9410)). 
13  Id. at 51–52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
14  Id. at 52 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02–9410)). 
15  Id. at 68. 
16  Id. at 68 n.10. 
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hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.”17 This is a list of examples, which are generally physical 
products and statements in formal, tangible form. Indeed, in the context 
of the facts of the Crawford case, even police interrogation meant a 
formal, physical product. It exhibits no clear connection to the function of 
the Clause, nor does the product give indications of what intent or 
expectation is required by the person who makes or receives the 
statement. 
In Davis, another opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court 
examined two more fact patterns under the testimonial-statement 
approach.18 It found nontestimonial one set of statements that started in 
an apparent emergency situation. However, it found another set of 
statements testimonial, even though the statements were made in the 
field not long after an apparent assault, because the purpose of the police 
questioners was to establish facts about past events. 
Davis, like Crawford, declined to provide a comprehensive 
definition. Although possibly understandable, it should be clear to the 
Court that the lack of a general definition is causing major problems in 
criminal cases throughout the United States. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
criticized this same uncertainty in Crawford.19 What is truly remarkable, 
however, is that Davis did not build positively on any of the three 
suggested potential definitions set out above in Crawford. 
Positively, Davis only amplified slightly the coverage of testimonial 
statements: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.20 
This minor clarification, albeit important, appears to go backward 
rather than forward in terms of developing a comprehensive definition. 
It is couched generally in the language of Webster’s Dictionary rather 
than clarifying the language of any of the three proposed definitions 
from the Crawford opinion. It also does not move toward a general 
approach that is tailored to categorize the major types of circumstances 
commonly encountered in criminal prosecutions. 
                                               
17  Id. at 68. 
18  126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276–80 (2006). 
19  541 U.S. at 70, 75–76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
20  126 S. Ct. at 2273–74. 
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III. SOFTENING FORMALITY 
Davis’s most important clarification of a possible general 
interpretation of “testimonial” as suggested in Crawford is negative.21 It 
rejects the definition centered on the formality and formalism of the 
Justice Thomas definition, which was taken from his concurring opinion 
in White v. Illinois (with Justice Scalia concurring) and was the Court’s 
first signal of what was to come in Crawford. Moreover, it specifically 
rejects some of the more extreme amplifications of such a definition. 
Justice Thomas would have defined testimonial statements as 
“‘formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.’”22 Justice Scalia unmistakably departed from 
this signature feature of that proposed definition. Instead, he de-
emphasized the importance of the formality of the statement, which is at 
the core of Justice Thomas’s definition and which begins Webster’s 
formulation—“‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation.’”23 
Concretely, in Davis, the testimonial statements were oral 
statements made in the field to a police officer. Justice Thomas, in 
dissent, argued that recognizing such a statement as testimonial 
deviated both from Webster’s definition, which the majority itself had 
endorsed,24 and from the historical example exemplified by the formality 
of proceedings before the examining magistrates under the Marian 
Statutes. 
 This requirement of solemnity supports my view that the 
statements regulated by the Confrontation Clause must include 
“extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.” Affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony are, by their 
very nature, taken through a formalized process. Likewise, 
confessions, when extracted by police in a formal manner, carry 
sufficient indicia of solemnity to constitute formalized statements and, 
accordingly, bear a “striking resemblance,” to examinations of the 
accused and accusers under the Marian Statutes. 
                                               
21  See Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana: Beating 
Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 6, 7–9 (2006), http://students. 
law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/mosteller.pdf. 
22  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., concurring)). 
23  Id. at 51 (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 11, at 91). 
24  “But the plain terms of the ‘testimony’ definition we endorsed necessarily require 
some degree of solemnity before a statement can be deemed ‘testimonial.’” Davis, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2282 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). As noted 
earlier, the majority did not abandon a requirement of formality. Justice Scalia explicitly 
stated: “We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance.” Id. 
at 2279 n.5 (majority opinion). However, in Justice Thomas’s judgment, the “softening” of 
the requirement had gone too far. 
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. . . Interactions between the police and an accused (or witnesses) 
resemble Marian proceedings—and [“the early American cases 
invoking the right to confrontation or the Confrontation Clause 
itself”]—only when the interactions are somehow rendered “formal.” In 
Crawford, for example, the interrogation was custodial, taken after 
warnings given pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . 
. . . Miranda warnings, by their terms, inform a prospective defendant 
that “‘anything he says can be used against him in a court of law.’” 
This imports a solemnity to the process that is not present in a mere 
conversation between a witness or suspect and a police officer.25 
A. Rejecting Strict Formality of Statement Form 
Crawford left open the possibility that the form of the statement—
whether it was written or recorded—might be given dispositive weight. 
One unfortunate consequence of this type of definition is that it would 
invite manipulation by investigative officers in their decision to record a 
statement or to rely on memory or informal notes.26 However, in Davis, 
while explicitly acknowledging a formality requirement—“[w]e do not 
dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance”27—
the Supreme Court clearly eliminated some of the extreme readings of 
formality and generally softened the requirement. 
In apparent response to Justice Thomas’s arguments in dissent, the 
Court acknowledged that most of the early American cases dealing with 
the Confrontation Clause or its state or common-law counterparts 
involved formal statements. However, that was not true, it noted, of “the 
English cases [which] were the progenitors of the Confrontation 
Clause.”28 The Court generalized its point: “[W]e do not think it 
conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily 
be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay 
testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a 
                                               
25  Id. at 2282–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (citations omitted) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000). 
26  See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 555 (2005). Some lower courts 
effectively embraced this distinction and invited future determination of testimonial 
quality by the decision whether to record. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 
856–57 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the interview was not recorded and that no evidence 
existed to show that the police detective “even so much as recorded it later in a police 
report”), review granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). The majority in Davis readily recognized the 
possibility of police evasion of coverage through “informal” recording of the statement, 126 
S. Ct. at 2276, and even Justice Thomas in his dissent would “reach[ ] the use of technically 
informal statements when used to evade the formalized process.” Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
27  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.5 (majority opinion). 
28  Id. at 2276. 
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deposition.”29 It then extended the point through a broad positive 
formulation: “The product of [police interrogation to prove or establish 
past crime], whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or 
embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating 
officer, is testimonial.”30 
The clarification is not theoretically momentous, but it has 
significant practical import. Without this explanation, the testimonial 
label might be found to turn on whether the police asked the witness to 
provide a written and signed statement or received exactly the same 
information but memorialized it less formally.31 
B. Rejecting Strict Formality of Proceedings and Limitation to 
Procedural Situations Resembling Historical Inquisitorial Practices 
In his dissenting opinion in Davis, Justice Thomas limited his 
earlier proposed definition of “testimonial” along the lines that a number 
of lower courts had followed, by limiting the testimonial concept to 
statements produced in rigorous interrogation proceedings that 
resembled those under the Marian Statutes. A number of lower courts 
excluded most statements received by officers in the field because they 
did not resemble the procedures employed by the examining magistrates 
under the Marian Statutes. Together, the formality of the form of the 
statement (written or recorded) and the formality of proceedings would 
have frequently permitted investigators to obtain accusatory hearsay 
statements and still avoid Confrontation Clause protection. 
Hammon v. Indiana rejected the effort to limit testimonial 
statements to those produced in procedures resembling the historical 
situations that concerned the Framers. In doing so, Justice Scalia 
indicated that he believed original principles should be translated into 
changed circumstances even if he is not fully accepting of a Constitution 
that is evolving by stating the following:32 “Restricting the Confrontation 
                                               
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  See Mosteller, supra note 26, at 539–40 (describing how the decision of the police 
not to interview a witness in the field but instead to take the witness to the police station 
to receive a written statement could determine whether the statement was ruled 
testimonial under some formulations of the Crawford test, and arguing that if formality of 
that sort were decisive, it would likely lead to manipulation and countermeasures by the 
police to avoid the testimonial determination). 
32  See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–10 (2005) (drawing a distinction between an originalist view that 
original principles may be modified to fit changed circumstances and the non-originalist 
view of an evolving or living Constitution). 
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Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally directed is a 
recipe for its extinction.”33 
C. Rejecting a Rigorous Interrogation Requirement 
The Crawford opinion was open to the interpretation that formality 
required rigorous station-house interrogation because rigorous 
interrogation occurred in that case. It spoke both of police interrogation 
and structured questioning. Indeed, Justice Thomas argued that the 
provision of Miranda warnings in the Crawford case in the context of 
custodial interrogation adequately resembled the Marian procedures and 
thereby provided “sufficient . . . solemnity to constitute formalized 
statements.”34 
Hammon, the companion case to Davis, presented a quite different 
situation. In Hammon, the questioning was in the field rather than in 
the police station, and the person questioned was an apparent victim 
and clearly not a criminal suspect. One could hardly imagine a situation 
where questioning a victim would be nearly as forceful and rigorous as 
that involved in Crawford, where Sylvia Crawford was a suspected co-
participant in the aggravated assault. The Court found that none of 
these differences mattered to its determination that the statements were 
testimonial. However, Justice Scalia did not remove all sense that 
special formality was or might be required, leaving the possibility of 
some future limitations of this type to general inclusion of non-
emergency investigative interviews within testimonial statements. 
Justice Scalia recognized that the circumstances of the Crawford 
interrogation were more formal than Hammon, which he viewed 
functionally: “[T]hese features certainly strengthened the statements’ 
testimonial aspect—made it more objectively apparent, that is, that the 
purpose of the exercise was to nail down the truth about past criminal 
events . . . .”35 He found that none of those formalities—(1) the giving of 
Miranda warnings, (2) the fact they were tape recorded, and (3) the fact 
they were made at the station house—was required. Comparing the 
situation in Hammon to Crawford, he provided the following description: 
Both declarants were actively separated from the defendant . . . . Both 
statements deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, 
how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. And both 
took place some time after the events described were over. Such 
statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for 
                                               
33  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.5. 
34  Id. at 2282 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
35  Id. at 2278 (majority opinion). 
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live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct 
examination; they are inherently testimonial.36 
Justice Scalia continued to use the term “interrogation” to describe 
what occurred in Hammon. But, on the other hand, he appears to have 
eliminated interrogation as a requirement for formality. Furthermore, 
neither pointed questioning nor even questioning itself is required. He 
stated: “This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the 
absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The 
Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination 
volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they 
were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.”37 
What is left of these various elements of formality, formalism, and 
interrogation? Justice Scalia’s opinion certainly did not remove all 
limitations. For example, he noted the witnesses’ separation from the 
suspect as an apparently significant common feature of the two 
testimonial situations found by the Court. Such separation (“let me talk 
with you alone”) is quite different from a casual group conversation that 
one could imagine a police officer having with a group of people on a 
street corner. However, beyond imputing that basic message of some 
seriousness of purpose as opposed to informality of information 
gathering, it is hard to articulate in general terms the critical threshold 
in formality he is describing. He did not explain the purpose it served or 
how that feature might be evaluated across circumstances. More 
generally, his opinion continued to speak of “interrogation,” even when 
that term appeared no more accurate, and perhaps less so, than the less 
evocative term “questioning.”38 More significantly, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion kept in place the possibility that testimonial statements might 
be only those made to persons known to be government investigative 
agents, or indeed much more restrictively, only statements made to 
known police officers.  
Perhaps in response to Justice Thomas’s emphasis on Miranda 
warnings, he articulated a new and potentially very significant 
limitation. Largely out of the blue, he stated, “It imports sufficient 
formality . . . that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses.”39 Even if 
                                               
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 2274 n.1. As evidence for its conclusion, the Court noted that part of the 
evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter written by Lord Cobham “that was plainly 
not the result of sustained questioning.” Id. (citing The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), 
in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1, 1–60 (T.B. Howell ed., London, 
R. Bagshaw 1809) [hereinafter The Raleigh Trial]). 
38  Indeed, in discussing the movement from nontestimonial to testimonial status of 
statements made in Davis, Justice Scalia referred to McCrotty’s exchange with the 911 
operator as a “conversation,” which it clearly seemed to be. Id. at 2271–72. Nevertheless, 
he retained generally the interrogation characterization. 
39  Id. at 2279 n.5. 
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statements to known government officials and indeed to government 
investigators are the only statements covered, restricting the 
Confrontation Clause to those agents to whom making false statements 
is a criminal offense is not a minor matter.40 
IV. REMAINING POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
A. The Highly Questionable Potential Requirement that a Statement 
Must be a Criminal Offense “If It Were” a False Statement 
Why the Court in Davis focused on the possibility of prosecution for 
making a false statement as adding sufficient formality is curious, if not 
inexplicable. In response to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting 
argument in Crawford, Justice Scalia contended that “[e]ven if . . . there 
were no direct evidence [on] how the Sixth Amendment originally 
applied to unsworn testimony, there is no doubt what its application 
would have been.”41 The answer to his rhetorical question is clear: the 
Confrontation Clause would have applied. We know because Justice 
Scalia says it is “implausible that a provision which concededly 
condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex 
parte affidavit perfectly OK.”42 If that explanation is accurate as to 
sworn statements, why would Justice Scalia now contend that the 
obviously ridiculous distinction is appropriate when we substitute for 
sworn statements, statements subject to prosecution if false? Indeed, 
limiting testimonial statements to those statements that happen to be 
covered by a statute criminalizing purposefully false statements would 
be less sensible than limiting them to statements under oath.43 
                                               
40  Statements of children to school social workers, school teachers, and doctors who 
were explicitly eliciting statements for the purpose of establishing or proving a crime (e.g., 
child sexual abuse) could be excluded from the testimonial definition by the requirement 
that giving false statements constitutes a criminal offense, even if not already eliminated 
by a requirement that the statement be received by either a government agent or a 
government investigative agent. 
41  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004). 
42  Id. 
43  The rationale behind Justice Scalia’s posing of the rhetorical question that 
answers itself is unclear. One possibility is that a statement that performs the same 
function as testimony at trial—for example, a highly incriminating accusation by an out-of-
court declarant—could not possibly be treated differently based on whether it was or was 
not made under oath. If this is the rationale, Justice Scalia is employing some limited 
version of a functional analysis, which is suggested by the decision to cover statements to 
police officers made during an interview in the field in Hammon. The second possibility is 
based on reliability: surely if there is a need to confront and cross-examine a declarant who 
made a statement under oath, which should have enhanced reliability because it was made 
under oath, the need would be even greater as to less reliable statements not made under 
oath. Either rationale makes some sense, but both are fundamentally inconsistent with the 
formal and formalistic testimonial-statement definition that Justice Scalia supports. 
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Perhaps Justice Scalia saw the possibility of prosecution for false 
statements as a substitute for the oath before the examining magistrates 
under the Marian Statutes, but if so, it is hardly equivalent and would 
be a bizarre requirement. First, unlike the possibility of a (typically 
minor) criminal penalty for such a false statement, the ancient oath 
carried with it not only the possibility of punishment by the authorities, 
but the far more serious promise of divine punishment combined with 
the additional obligation to answer on pain of contempt.44 Also, the 
publicly administered oath draws the speaker’s attention to the 
obligation, and even today it is recognized to communicate the solemnity 
of the situation and the seriousness of the enterprise.45 
Justice Scalia describes his test and examples as follows: “The 
solemnity of even an oral declaration of relevant past fact to an 
investigating officer is well enough established by the severe 
consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.”46 By contrast to 
the formally and publicly administered oath or affirmation, neither 18 
U.S.C. § 1001, the federal provision,47 nor section 946.41 of the 
                                                                                                              
Indeed, in terms of formality, sworn statements are more like testimony than 
unsworn statements. So, under a definition based on formality, the distinction that Justice 
Scalia rhetorically suggests is obviously ridiculous would hardly be so. Under that 
language, perhaps treating sworn statements different from unsworn ones might make 
some sense. But Justice Scalia rejects that distinction. Given this position, the distinction 
between statements subject to prosecution for false statement and those not subject to 
criminal punishment should not stand because the arguments against the distinction are 
stronger and those supporting the distinction are weaker than when the oath is involved. 
44  Sanction for false statement is only one element of the “cruel trilemma” that 
testimony under formal oath carried with it. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (“The privilege . . . [is founded on] our unwillingness to 
subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or 
contempt . . . .”). 
45  See FED. R. EVID. 603. In modern practice this rule is supposed to be 
implemented with flexibility to deal with the needs of “religious adults, atheists, 
conscientious objectors, mental defectives, and children.” Id. advisory committee’s note. 
The rule states that the oath or affirmation is to be “administered in a form calculated to 
awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with the duty to [testify 
truthfully].” Id. This function of the publicly administered oath is an obvious element of its 
importance throughout history. Punishment for false statement, not announced, would 
appear qualitatively quite different in terms of its effect on solemnity. 
46  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. 
Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 288 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that false statements made to federal 
investigators violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001); State v. Reed, 695 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Wis. 2005) 
(holding that it is a state criminal offense to “knowingly giv[e] false information to [an] 
officer with [the] intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty”). 
47  The statute reads as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter 
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the 
Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully— 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a 
material fact; 
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Wisconsin Statutes (which was the statute at issue in State v. Reed),48 
require that a violator be warned of the potential criminal consequences 
of his or her statement if falsely made. Perhaps Justice Scalia is 
assuming that the same purpose is accomplished without the oath or 
affirmation because everyone knows of the offense, perhaps because it is 
so serious. Justice Scalia states the consequences are severe, but the 
Wisconsin statute ordinarily punishes the crime only as a 
misdemeanor,49 which appears typical of state treatment of the offense.50 
                                                                                                              
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the 
offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 
2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an 
offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of 
imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years. 
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that 
party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents 
submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. 
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative 
branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to— 
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter 
related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or 
employment practices, or support services, or a document required by 
law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or 
officer within the legislative branch; or 
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of 
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, 
consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). 
48  The Wisconsin statute criminalizes generally “[w]homever knowingly resists or 
obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in an official capacity and with 
lawful authority.” WIS. STAT. § 946.41(1) (2005). It defines “obstructs” as including “without 
limitation knowingly giving false information to the officer or knowingly placing physical 
evidence with intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty.” Id. § 
946.41(2)(a). 
Reed, which the United States Supreme Court cites, interprets this statute, which 
has something of the form of an obstruction of justice statute, as requiring only a 
materially false statement: “In order to be convicted of this crime, Reed would have to have 
knowingly given an officer false information and done so with the intent to mislead the 
officer. As long as the officer was doing an act in an official capacity, and was acting with 
lawful authority, the statute has been satisfied.” Reed, 695 N.W.2d at 321. 
49  WIS. STAT. § 946.41(1). The statute treats the offense as a Class A misdemeanor 
unless two additional requirements are satisfied: (1) the trier of fact considers the evidence 
at trial and (2) an innocent person is convicted. In that situation, it is a low grade felony 
(Class H felony). Id. § 946.41(2m). 
50  New York grades its offense a Class A misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50 
(McKinney Supp. 2007). North Carolina grades its offense as a Class 2 misdemeanor. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-225 (2005). Ohio grades the offense a misdemeanor of the “second degree,” 
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That everyone knows of the offense is also unlikely given the widely 
variable coverage of the two examples Justice Scalia cites. The federal 
statute covers, with exceptions, any material false statement made 
“within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of 
the Government of the United States.”51 It has extremely broad scope 
and is generously interpreted.52 By contrast, the Wisconsin statute, 
which appears more typical of state statutes, punishes only false 
statements to an officer, which is defined as someone allowed to make 
arrests.53 Of course, additional statutes may cover false statements made 
to different types of government officers and in other contexts, but 
variability would predictably be enormous across the nation. I believe 
that in the typical case where false unsworn statements made to law 
enforcement officers are prosecuted in the states, almost never is anyone 
put on notice that a false statement could be punished. The lack of notice 
is evidenced by the number of citizen-police interactions that entail some 
measure of self-protective falsehoods being stated to police officers. 
Furthermore, offenders are not on notice because the offense is 
tremendously underenforced and most often not even prosecuted. 
Finally, even if an offender is prosecuted, publicity is likely miminal and 
little notoriety is generated because it is only a minor offense. 
More significantly, these statutes have no relationship to the 
concerns of the Confrontation Clause, and a system that uses them as a 
dividing line for coverage would be absolutely ahistoric54 and without 
logical defense.55 Let us take two examples from the Raleigh case—the 
                                                                                                              
unless the obstruction “creates a risk of physical harm,” in which case it is a felony of the 
“fifth degree.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.31(B) (LexisNexis 2006). 
51  18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a). 
52  1 SARAH N. WELLING, SARA SUN BEALE & PAMELA H. BUCY, FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO § 12.7 
(1998). 
53 WIS. STAT. § 946.41(2)(b) (defining “officer” as “a peace officer or other public 
officer or public employee having the authority by virtue of the officer’s or employee’s office 
or employment to take another into custody”). 
54 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 is not a statute with roots in English common law, colonial 
history, nor the early years of the new nation. It even has nothing to do with an alternative 
to the oath. Rather, it has its origin in 1863 as part of the False Claims Act. In its earliest 
form, the statute covered only frauds against the government by military personnel that 
cause pecuniary or property loss. In 1872, criminal and civil provisions were separated. In 
1918 and 1934, the statute was expanded by Congress to cover frauds not involving 
military personnel to all those that frustrate government programs even though not 
causing pecuniary or property loss. 1 WELLING ET AL., supra note 52, § 12.7. Under Justice 
Scalia’s suggested distinction, it would appear that statements made to federal law-
enforcement officers for the first century after adoption of the Confrontation Clause were 
not covered by the Clause because Congress had not enacted criminal punishment for false 
statements made to these officers. That result does not seem sensible to say the least. 
55 It is not reasonable that reports would violate the Confrontation Clause if made 
in a state, such as Wisconsin, where a false statement is an offense, see supra notes 49, but 
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statements of Lord Cobham and those from a witness named Dyer who 
told of statements made by a Portugese gentleman that Raleigh and 
Cobham conspired to have the king killed.56 Practically, neither would be 
prosecuted as false statements, a fact that the speaker would likely 
appreciate. Moreover, the former might not even be a theoretical 
violation of some state statutes that are based on obstruction of justice 
concepts,57 and the second would not be criminal under either the federal 
or state statutes. 
                                                                                                              
the identical statement would not be covered by the United States Constitution if made in 
another state where the statute imposes different requirements, such as New York or 
North Carolina. See infra note 57. 
56 Jardine gives the testimony of Dyer at Raleigh’s trial as follows: 
Being at Lisbon, there came to me a Portugal gentleman who asked me how 
the King of England did, and whether he was crowned? I answered him that I 
hoped our noble King was well and crowned by this, but the time was not come 
when I came from the coast for Spain. “Nay,” said he, “your King shall never be 
crowned, for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh will cut his throat before he come to 
be crowned.” 
1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 436 (London, Knight 1832). 
57 The North Carolina statute reads as follows: 
Any person who shall willfully make or cause to be made to a law 
enforcement agency or officer any false, misleading or unfounded report, for the 
purpose of interfering with the operation of a law enforcement agency, or to 
hinder or obstruct any law enforcement officer in the performance of his duty, 
shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-225 (2005). 
The North Carolina statute did not remove the explicit obstruction element or 
expand the statute’s scope to cover any false statement to a police officer. In State v. 
Hughes, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in the process of refusing to find a confidential 
informant’s tip sufficient to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment, stated: 
The State argues that this was a case of declaration against penal interest 
because . . . [inter alia], since giving a false report to the police is a 
misdemeanor, the informant risked criminal charges if his information was not 
truthful. We are not persuaded by this argument, and we conclude that, under 
the circumstances, the burden of reliability was not met.  
. . . [M]aking a false statement to the police, standing alone, is not against 
an individual’s penal interest because doing so is not a crime. To be charged 
with the crime of making a false report to law enforcement agencies or officers, 
the evidence must show that the person willfully made a false or misleading 
statement to a law enforcement agency or officer for the purpose of interfering 
with the law enforcement agency or hindering or obstructing the officer in the 
performance of his duties.  
539 S.E.2d 625, 629 (N.C. 2000) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-225 (1994)). 
The states’ treatment of this crime is far from uniform. A New York statute makes it 
a crime to gratuitously make a false report of an event or offense that did not occur. N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 240.50(3) (McKinney Supp. 2007). “Gratuitously” within the meaning of the 
statute occurs “only where that information is volunteered and is unsolicited.” See People 
ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (Sup. Ct. 1971). A false report made during 
a police investigation in response to questions cannot be punished under the statute. Id. at 
909. 
2007] SOFTENING THE FORMALITY 443 
We are told in Crawford that the Framers were most concerned 
about evidence produced by the government through secret 
interrogations,58 which coerced, presumably, false statements 
incriminating the accused. Justice Scalia’s false statement statutes 
would facially appear to cover those situations, but the crime people are 
typically punished for is giving false exculpatory statements, not false 
statements incriminating another.59 Critically, although the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned with the latter statements, it is those 
statements that the statute de facto does not reach. 
Indeed, in situations where the confrontation right is needed, the 
authorities believe the declarant’s statements are true, not false. The 
statements may be false, but that is obviously of no negative 
consequence to the declarant if the authorities believe them to be true. 
Alternatively, and in fact inconsistent with the theory under which the 
Confrontation Clause is important, if the individual were to be 
prosecuted for making a false statement, or if the threat of that 
punishment had deterred the falsity, the Confrontation Clause would 
not have been needed.60 
Imagine the position of Lord Cobham, but place him, rather than in 
the Privy Council under formal interrogation which led to a written 
accusation, “on the street” in conversation with a police officer. The 
historic exchange might go something like this: 
                                               
58 The Court stated in Crawford that “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the 
production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for 
prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the 
Framers were keenly familiar.” 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
59 See, e.g., State v. Lazzaro, 667 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio 1996) (prosecuting individual at 
nursing home for false statement that there were no witnesses to an assault). Reed, cited 
by the Supreme Court, is typical in that the prosecution was for a false denial, but largely 
atypical in that the person who was in fact the driver, both denied his involvement and 
named another individual as driver, who was never charged. State v. Reed, 695 N.W.2d 
315, 317 (Wis. 2005). 
60 There was a time in the development of the common law when the oath was 
considered extremely important, indeed, in some instances an alternative protection to 
confrontation. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay 
Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 
740–41 (noting the importance of the oath in English common law development and its 
acceptance in some situations as an alternative to confrontation). Defining a confrontation 
right that is triggered by a factor that was seen as its substitute or in a later era as a 
guarantee of trustworthiness is at least somewhat incoherent and perhaps backward. The 
same can be said with more force, because it lacks any historical pretensions of the false 
statement offense, which is a basis for the reviled concept of reliability. See Hughes, 539 
S.E.2d at 629 (describing the prosecution’s argument that the false statement statute made 
the informer’s statements more reliable for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because 
those statements, if false, would be criminal). 
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Officer: “Cobham, you know we have the goods on you and your pal 
Raleigh. You might as well tell us what you know, and by the way, 
Raleigh has said some awful things about you.” 
Cobham: “Raleigh has been saying those things? Oh, OK. You’re right. 
Raleigh was in the middle of the plot. Actually, it was all his idea.” 
No false statement prosecution would occur as a result of this 
conversation. First, presumably because he is parroting their theory, the 
prosecution believes that Cobham’s presumed lies are true. As a result, 
he is in no danger of prosecution for his statement whether treated 
under either federal or state versions of the false statement statute. 
Unlike the federal statute, the state laws are general applications of an 
obstruction of justice that requires impeding the officer. As a result, it is 
unclear that Cobham could be prosecuted for giving a false statement if 
the authorities came to question that Raleigh was involved under at 
least some version of the state paradigm. After all, he gave his statement 
with the intent to aid the officer in achieving the government’s 
proclaimed goal, which is exactly what Cobham was doing under the 
theory Raleigh espoused and the Framers apparently embraced. 
Now let us take another less well-known set of statements in the 
Raleigh case: the claim through a witness named Dyer that he heard a 
Portugese gentleman say that Raleigh and Cobham would have the king 
killed.61 Lots of possibilities can be imagined, but some commentators 
have noted that this statement was probably made without any personal 
knowledge by the speaker of its truth.62 Let us assume, as may have 
been the case, that the Portugese gentleman believed it true but had no 
foundation for the statement. The false statement statutes, both federal 
and state, require that the declarant make the statement knowing it to 
be false. Thus, a statement that is in fact false is not criminal if the 
speaker believes in its truth. 
The situation of individuals who believe their false statements are 
true is often posited in cases involving children who are questioned by 
leading and suggestive methods. Suggestive questioning, overbearing 
manner, and preconceived result by the questioner are the dangers that 
lie behind the determinations of both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court to exclude the statement in Idaho v. 
                                               
61 For a further discussion of this problematic hearsay in the Raleigh trial and its 
possible implications for historical support for a broader Confrontation Clause protection 
than Crawford and Davis, see Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J. L. & 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2007). 
62 Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 90 
(1987). 
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Wright.63 These concerns reflect major, real issues for admission of 
hearsay statements made by children. 
Absolutely nothing historically based and almost nothing sensible 
can be predicated on a distinction that makes coverage of the 
Confrontation Clause to statements dependent on whether a modern 
false statement statute criminalizes a false answer. Justice Scalia points 
to no historical practices he is modeling. More importantly, there is no 
indication that the Framers meant to restrict the Confrontation Clause 
only to statements that were known by the speaker to be false when 
made. Surely, those who were concerned about confrontation, as well as 
those who theorize about hearsay, understand that a critical reason to 
have a person who made a statement out of court take the stand for 
cross-examination is to determine, in addition to whether the person is 
purposefully lying, what the basis is for that statement. 
It should be inconceivable that a highly accusatory statement made 
about a past crime to a person expected to provide it to the prosecution 
for use at trial would receive Confrontation Clause protection because 
that statement, if it were false, might be prosecuted under the false 
statement laws. However, the same statement would escape 
Confrontation Clause coverage if made to a government official who 
lacked, for example, arrest power. The distinction would often (perhaps 
generally) be unknown to the speaker. Moreover, allowing these 
statements violates our worst historical examples—i.e., those made by 
Lord Cobham where the speaker would know that he or she will not be 
prosecuted because that person is doing the government’s bidding or, 
like the Portugese gentleman,64 where he or she believes the statement 
to be true, therefore, making the false statement statute inapplicable. 
B. The Broad Potential Limitation that Only Statements Made to Known 
Government Officials or Their Recognized Agents Will be Covered 
The Court did nothing to remove the far broader possible limitation 
that only statements made to known government investigative agents 
can be considered testimonial. It assumed, without deciding, that if 911 
operators are not police officers, they may be agents of law enforcement 
when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers. After making this 
                                               
63 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
64 Similarly, the child in Wright was either telling the truth, convinced of the 
accused’s guilt, or coerced into going along with the version of events provided to her by a 
forceful adult. In any of these situations, the child is not guilty of the crime. Moreover, the 
doctor in the case would not be covered by the statute. 
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assumption, the Court noted that as in Crawford, it need not decide 
whether these features were requirements.65 
Professor Richard Friedman has adeptly pointed out66 that the 
Court in Davis cited a case that involved a statement made from a child 
to her mother as an apparent example of an application of the common 
law principle of confrontation.67 The case, King v. Brasier,68 suggests that 
a statement to a known government officer is not required, since this 
statement was made by the child to her mother. This is indeed an 
interesting citation and a piece of important supporting evidence for 
what I believe is the appropriate result, but it cannot possibly constitute 
a resolution of the far broader question of whether government agents 
must be involved.69 Both Crawford and Davis specifically reserved for 
later decision the narrower question of whether statements made to 
anyone other than police officers could be testimonial,70 and both that 
narrower issue and the broader one could not be resolved by a single 
case citation, albeit a truly intriguing one. 
V. WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY AS NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
If one were looking for a text for Davis, one would immediately 
assume that text was the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
That is indeed where Justice Scalia nominally begins, with the accused’s 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” However, the 
true text he is interpreting in Davis is the definition of testimony in 
Noah Webster’s 1828 edition of An American Dictionary of the English 
                                               
65  The Court stated: “For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), 
we consider their acts to be acts of the police,” which as in Crawford “makes it unnecessary 
to consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement 
personnel are ‘testimonial.’” Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.2 (2006). 
66 Richard D. Friedman, “We Really (For the Most Part) Mean It!,” 105 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 5 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/ 
vol105/friedman.pdf. 
67 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. King v. Brasier is cited in an argument distinguishing 
its report shortly after the incident from the situation in the Davis facts, which the Court 
described as an ongoing emergency. The reference is brief and for the purpose of showing 
that the English cases do not support Davis’s position. Id. However, as the facts are set out, 
the Court recognized its applicability by stating that circumstances exist where the case 
“would be helpful to Davis.” Id. 
68 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779). 
69 As I describe in another article, the lower courts have consistently held that 
statements made to family members in situations like Brasier are nontestimonial. See 
Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A 
Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007). I have come to the 
conclusion that predicting with confidence future developments cannot be done, but there 
will be bases on which this pattern in the lower courts can be continued and Brasier 
ignored. The primary purpose rationale of Davis would seem to provide a completely 
sufficient basis to continue that result. Id. 
70 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
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Language.71 “Testimony” is defined there as “a solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”72 
Those are the words to which he looks in determining whether the 
statements of the two different victims should be treated as covered by 
the protections of the Confrontation Clause. 
However, as described above, Justice Scalia departs from the text 
when he feels it appropriate. He chooses not to emphasize the “solemn 
declaration or affirmation” aspect of the definition, upon which Justice 
Thomas focuses. But in Justice Scalia’s defense, he is unwilling to 
jettison the concept entirely. Instead, he focused on “made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” That focus becomes the 
core of the definition of testimonial statements in Davis. 
Davis articulated the following definition for testimonial: if made 
under police questioning, a statement is testimonial when “the 
circumstances objectively indicate that . . . the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.” 73 However, the resulting definition in Davis 
does not match any of the three comprehensive definitions suggested in 
Crawford. 
A. Unexplained Variation from the “Text” 
Justice Scalia’s test makes another somewhat more subtle but 
potentially very important shift from the “text,” which he does not even 
attempt to explain. In Webster’s Dictionary, the key inquiry is the 
purpose of the declaration or affirmation (“made for the purpose of”). In 
Justice Scalia’s test, the court must analyze the purpose of police 
questioning (“the primary purpose of interrogation is”). 
Thus, he shifts the critical intent focus from speaker to questioner. 
Then without explanation of how to reconcile the different perspectives 
or even whether he is speaking to exactly the same point, he makes a 
statement in a footnote on the same page that appears quite inconsistent 
with the idea of shifted perspective. He states, “And of course even when 
interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, 
not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires 
us to evaluate.”74 That statement seems to say that the Constitution’s 
                                               
71 I leave to one side and do not consider in my treatment of the issue the excellent 
research and arguments made by Professor Randy Jonakait that even Justice Scalia’s 
choice is selective among the many definitions offered by Webster for the word 
“testimonial.” See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: 
Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155 
(2006). 
72 2 WEBSTER, supra note 11, at 91. 
73 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273–74 (2006). 
74 Id. at 2274 n.1. 
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concern is the product of the interrogation and presumably, if intent 
matters, with the intent behind that product (the speaker’s intent) 
rather than the intent behind the questioning. However, if that is so, 
why the testimonial statement definition should distinguish between 
emergency and non-emergency situations based on “the primary purpose 
of the interrogation” rather than the purpose, intent, or expectation of 
the person making the statement is left totally unexplained.75 
Crawford provided both a historical and a policy-oriented 
justification for the appropriateness of focusing on the questioners when 
they are government agents. There the Court stated that “[i]nvolvement 
of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward 
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out 
time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were 
keenly familiar.”76 That policy concern and that historical experience 
might warrant particular scrutiny toward the intent of government 
interrogators. 
If a single perspective must be chosen, that of the investigative 
questioner might be the most appropriate because, in many situations, it 
may be the most easily determined. Furthermore, potential 
manipulation by a government agent who is investigating a crime is 
likely the greater danger to the criminal accused’s confrontation rights. 
Fortunately, whose intent matters is usually insignificant because in the 
vast majority of cases the intent of both parties is the same. When the 
objectively discernable purpose of the police is to establish or prove a 
past fact potentially relevant to criminal prosecution, that purpose will 
usually be readily observable to the speaker as well as the police. 
Much is left to be determined about this shift to the primary 
purpose of the government officer as questioner. It may reflect not a full 
determination of when the statement is testimonial, or even a necessary 
condition, but instead a sufficient condition. A statement may be 
testimonial if the government officer’s primary purpose is to establish 
past facts potentially relevant to criminal prosecution in a non-
emergency situation regardless of the speaker’s purpose, intent, or 
expectation. 
Although Davis dealt with only two potential purposes—enabling 
the police to deal with an ongoing emergency and establishing past facts 
relevant to criminal prosecution—presumably other questioners may 
have other purposes. Seemingly, however, only one purpose—
establishing past facts relevant to criminal prosecution or something 
very close to that purpose—leads to the determination that the 
statement is testimonial. All other purposes apparently lead to a 
                                               
75 Id. at 2274. 
76 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
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nontestimonial determination. Moreover, as to any other purpose, even 
the establishment of past facts would presumably not render the 
statement testimonial.77 
B. The Appropriate Focus in Some Situations is the Intent of the 
Declarant 
A single perspective is not required or even suggested by the right 
at issue. Although being interested in both the intent of the questioner 
and the speaker is unusual, it is quite appropriate for the Confrontation 
Clause. In Confrontation Clause cases, as opposed to Miranda cases, for 
example, the party being protected is not the person (witness-declarant) 
who is being questioned. It is instead the defendant against whom the 
statement is being introduced. And the critical constitutional violation 
occurs at the time of admission by the government against the accused 
at trial, regardless of whether one focuses on the intent of speaker or 
questioner at the time that statement was made. In Davis, Justice Scalia 
notes that “it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex 
parte testimonial statements which offends [the Confrontation 
Clause].”78 
The harm in not being able to cross-examine the witness is the same 
regardless of whether the police intended to manipulate an answer from 
the witness, or the witness intended to manipulate the police and the 
proceeding, or the witness was simply mistaken. And there is reason to 
assume the Framers also considered the malicious or mistaken witness 
perspective. Crawford implicitly tells us that the Framers were 
interested in more than just the abuses of government manipulation 
(which was the subject of the Raleigh case and the Privy Council’s 
interrogation), such as where the crime was against the government and 
government manipulation and coercion of witnesses would be a prime 
concern. Crawford also tells us that the Confrontation Clause was 
responsive to the Marian Statutes, which applied to ordinary crimes 
committed by private citizens where the government’s interest (as 
opposed to a possible private interest) in manipulating the facts would 
not have been nearly as clear as in a treason prosecution such as 
Raleigh’s.79 Webster’s focus on the intent of the testifier—the person 
making the out-of-court statement—as opposed to the questioner, adds 
“textual” support to this historical argument. 
                                               
77 For a more detailed treatment of the primary purpose test, its implications, and 
its potentially critical impact in cases involving statements by children, see Mosteller, 
Crawford’s Impact, supra note 5, at 414–15. See generally Mosteller, supra note 69. 
78 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6. 
79 Mosteller, supra note 26, at 571–72. 
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I suggest that focusing on the declarant’s perspective is most critical 
in situations where police officers are not involved. In that situation, if 
the statement can be covered by the testimonial concept, which I believe 
should be possible, and the witness has an intent to establish or prove a 
fact about a past crime, the statement should be considered testimonial. 
Such an analysis is needed at least to avert purposeful avoidance of the 
Confrontation Clause by a knowledgeable witness. Also, pursuant to 
Webster’s “text,” considering the declarant’s perspective is undeniably 
proper. Presumably, for the speaker’s purpose or intent to render the 
statement testimonial, that purpose or intent would need to be quite 
clear. Finding this clear purpose or intent would be a rare situation 
because speakers do not often relay relevant information for the purpose 
of a criminal prosecution to a private individual instead of to a 
government official. 
VI. CASE STUDY IN THE “MISAPPLICATION” OF CRAWFORD AND THE IMPACT 
OF DAVIS 
I present again80 the fact pattern from a case that should have been 
treated as “testimonial” and as falling within Crawford, but was not 
when considered by the lower courts. The North Carolina courts gave the 
Clause a reading that demonstrates the trappings of a specific 
formalism. While not entirely clear under Davis, I believe this fact 
pattern illustrates well how the Court’s second look at the testimonial 
concept at least softened the edges of the formality and formalism that 
Crawford and Justice Thomas’s definition invited. 
The fact pattern is from State v. Forrest,81 which the U.S. Supreme 
Court vacated and remanded after Davis,82 but which was never fully 
resolved because Forrest was killed shortly after remand.83 
                                               
80 In an essay written before Davis, I used this fact pattern to illustrate the misuse 
that may be made of the ambiguity of Crawford combined with its formality and 
formalism. See Mosteller, “Accusatorial” Fix, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
81 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). After oral argument, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 
State v. Forrest, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005). 
82 Forrest v. North Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (granting certiorari, vacating 
the judgment, and remanding for further consideration in light of Davis). 
83 State v. Forrest, 636 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 2006) (vacating original opinion and then 
dismissing as moot). Forrest was a violent person. In his dissent in Deck v. Missouri, a case 
that concerned the propriety of shackling a criminal defendant, Justice Thomas cited 
Forrest’s conviction for attempted murder in the courtroom of his trial counsel during 
sentencing. 544 U.S. 622, 653 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Forrest, 609 
S.E.2d 241, 248–49 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)). This sentencing occurred upon his conviction in 
the case described in the text.  
On July 12, 2006, not long after the Supreme Court’s remand, Forrest was moving 
toward trial in an unrelated death penalty case. While in court, he snatched a revolver 
from a correction guard’s holster and fired it several times, wounding a guard. He was then 
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The case involved charges that Forrest kidnapped and assaulted 
with a deadly weapon his aunt, Cynthia Moore. Moore had been served 
with a subpoena but did not appear at Forrest’s trial and did not 
testify.84 Forrest was convicted based on Ms. Moore’s hearsay statements 
given to a police detective shortly after the incident, which were 
admitted as excited utterances.85 
The events described in Forrest’s trial began when, for some 
undisclosed reason, a police S.W.A.T. team surrounded and observed the 
house where Forrest was located for about an hour. During that period, 
Forrest escorted his aunt outside the house on two occasions where 
escalating violence was suggested. Inside the house, the two used crack 
cocaine after which Forrest became “paranoid.”86 
After darkness fell, Forrest left the house a third time with his aunt 
and they started down a nearby sidewalk. The officer in charge of the 
SWAT team ordered his men to “take down” Forrest. Police officers 
surrounded Forrest and, to demonstrate how heavily armed they were, 
illuminated him in the darkness with the lights attached to their “long 
guns.” Two officers put submachine guns to Forrest’s forehead. They 
separated him from Ms. Moore, who was injured with small lacerations 
on her neck and over an inch-long laceration on her arm. Forrest was 
taken away in police custody. 
Waiting nearby was a police detective, Detective Melanie Blalock. 
According to her testimony, she was there for the purpose of 
interviewing Ms. Moore—testimony that was perhaps less circumspect 
regarding the sole purpose of interviewing the witness than it might 
have been had Crawford and Davis already been decided. However, at 
the time she testified, her intent was largely, if not entirely, irrelevant to 
the statement’s admissibility, which faced only the question of whether 
it qualified as an excited utterance, and thus satisfied the Confrontation 
Clause as well.87 
                                                                                                              
fatally shot by a sheriff’s deputy who was also in the courtroom. Mandy Locke, Inmate 
Killed in Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 13, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 
WLNR 12062660. 
I am particularly familiar with the facts of Forrest, having filed an amicus brief on 
Forrest’s behalf in the North Carolina Supreme Court both on direct appeal and after 
remand following the Davis decision, and participated in oral argument on both occasions. 
84 Forrest, 596 S.E.2d at 23, 30. 
85 Id. at 28–29. 
86  Knowledge of most of the events inside the house were provided through the 
hearsay statements of the victim/aunt who never testified, but instead were given to a 
police detective with whom she spoke after Forrest’s capture. 
87 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (treating “firmly rooted” hearsay 
exceptions, which includes excited utterances, as automatically satisfying the reliability 
requirement of the Confrontation Clause); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–56 
(1992) (ruling that unavailability need not be shown for excited utterances). At the time 
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When Detective Blalock moved from her nearby location to the 
crime scene, Forrest had been taken away. Moore, the victim, was 
standing in the street with another officer. That officer brought Moore to 
Blalock. She was crying and her arm was bleeding. Blalock informed 
Moore that she was calling emergency medical services. At some point, 
the medics arrived and treated the wounds, but Moore declined to be 
treated further at a hospital. 
Detective Blalock stated that Moore “was nervous, she was shaking, 
she was crying and she was anxious to tell me that she had been held in 
the house . . . . [S]he appeared anxious to tell me what happened. And by 
that I didn’t have to ask her what happened to you.”88 Blalock testified 
that she did not ask any questions initially, and that Moore “just 
immediately abruptly started talking and telling me.”89 
Moore’s statement, according to Detective Blalock, lasted about one 
minute, during which Moore related that Forrest had come to her house 
(at least an hour before the statement) and smoked crack cocaine. He 
then became paranoid and refused to let her leave, taking her from room 
to room at knife point. She attempted to run but the door was locked; 
and Forrest cut her.90 Blalock wrote notes regarding Moore’s statements, 
which she described in her testimony as highly accurate.91 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, 
found the statement nontestimonial under Crawford. The Court 
reasoned as follows: 
Moore’s statements concerning her kidnapping and violent assault 
were made immediately after her rescue by police with no time for 
reflection or thought on Moore’s part. These statements were initiated 
by the victim . . . . Detective Blalock testified that she did not have to 
ask Moore questions because she “immediately abruptly started 
talking.” . . . Although Detective Blalock was at the scene specifically 
to respond to Moore and later asked some questions, Detective Blalock 
did not question Moore until after she “abruptly started talking.” 
These facts do not warrant the conversation being deemed a “police 
interrogation” under Crawford. . . . She was not providing a formal 
statement, deposition, or affidavit, was not aware that she was 
bearing witness, and was not aware that her utterances might impact 
                                                                                                              
the statement was made to Detective Blalock, Roberts and White taken together 
established that statements within the excited utterance hearsay exception automatically 
satisfied the Confrontation Clause. 
88  Transcript of Proceedings at 94–95, State v. Forrest, No. 02 CRS 87696-98 (N.C. 
Wake County Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2003). 
89  Id. at 95. 
90  Id. at 95–97. In a somewhat later conversation with Detective Blalock, Moore 
stated that she had also used crack. 
91  Detective Blalock indicated that she took notes regarding what Moore told her, 
and at one point during her testimony, Blalock stated, “[L]et me refer to my notes as to 
exactly what she said,” which suggests precision in capturing Moore’s words. Id. at 95–96. 
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further legal proceedings . . . . Crawford protects defendants from an 
absent witness’s statements introduced after formal police 
interrogations in which the police are gathering additional information 
to further the prosecution of a defendant. Crawford does not prohibit 
spontaneous statements from an unavailable witness like those at 
bar.92 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Crawford, seemed to invite such 
possible results. It described the statements as the result of police 
interrogation, and used the term “structured . . . questioning.”93 As the 
lower court found and relied upon, the statement in Forrest was not the 
result of structured questioning. 
The principal statement of the test in Davis moves the law toward a 
relatively clear resolution of a case like Forrest. That test, which holds 
statements “testimonial when the circumstance objectively indicates that 
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution,”94 renders a significant class of investigative 
conversations testimonial. Moreover, Davis’s additional explanatory 
language eliminates a number of possible ambiguities. 
A. Interrogation Not Required 
As the Davis Court explained: 
 Our holding refers to interrogations because, as explained below, 
the statements in the cases presently before us are the products of 
interrogations—which in some circumstances tend to generate 
testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements 
made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily 
nontestimonial. The Framers were no more willing to exempt from 
cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended 
questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation. 
(Part of the evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from 
Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of sustained questioning) 
And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis 
the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the 
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.95 
B. Formality of Statement Form Not Required 
The Court in Davis also eliminated any argument of a rigid 
formality with respect to the physical form of the statement. It held: 
                                               
92  State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
93  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004). 
94  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273–74 (2006). 
95  Id. at 2274 n.1 (first emphasis added) (citing The Raleigh Trial, supra note 37, at 
2–60). 
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“The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing signed 
by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the 
interrogating officer, is testimonial.”96 
C. Emergency Situation is Limited to Physical Safety                            
and Can Change Quickly 
In Davis, the Court held the initial interrogation in the 911 call was 
not testimonial because it was “not designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or 
prov[e]’ some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring 
police assistance.”97 It, however, noted that even an emergency situation, 
which does not give rise to testimonial statements, can rather quickly 
evolve into one where statements made are testimonial: “In this case, for 
example, . . . the emergency appears to have ended (when Davis drove 
away from the premises).”98 Similarly, in Hammon, the Court concluded 
that the statement taken by a police officer in the field in response to an 
open-ended question was testimonial. Although apparently the officers 
arrived not long after the violence had ended, “there was no immediate 
threat to [the declarant’s] person,” and the officer “was not seeking to 
determine (as in Davis) ‘what is happening,’ but rather ‘what 
happened.’”99 
The Forrest majority relied upon the reasoning set forth in People v. 
Moscat100 in concluding that the witness’s statement to Detective Blalock 
was nontestimonial. In Moscat, the New York court determined that a 
911 telephone call requesting emergency assistance was nontestimonial. 
The situation presented by a 911 call, however, is fundamentally 
different from the facts of the instant case. As noted by the Moscat court, 
a 911 call “is generated not by the desire of the prosecution or the police 
to seek evidence against a particular suspect; rather the 911 call has its 
genesis in the urgent desire of a citizen to be rescued from immediate 
peril.”101 
Given this more clearly established framework, it is now virtually 
certain that under the Forrest facts, Moore’s statements to Blalock were 
testimonial.102 At the time the statement was taken, the defendant had 
                                               
96  Id. at 2276. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 2277. 
99  Id. at 2278. 
100  777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004). 
101  Id. at 879. 
102  The description given by Judge Wynn in dissent is rather faithful to Davis’s later 
analysis. Wynn wrote: 
In the instant case, the witness gave a statement to law enforcement 
officers describing Defendant’s actions during the incident . . . . The police 
officer who interviewed the witness, Detective Blalock, testified it was her 
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been arrested and removed from the scene. Also, the scene was secure. 
Moore, the victim, had reached a point of safety, which distinguishes this 
case from the logic of 911 calls generally, and her statements were not 
about rescue, or safety, or even medical care. The line that the Court 
drew in Davis when it indicated that the purpose of questioning changed 
when Davis left the scene is a useful one, and it offers further help in 
clarifying situations of this type. 
Detective Blalock’s purpose at the scene of the incident was to 
obtain the victim’s statement for use in prosecution of Forrest. That was 
shown unmistakably by her direct testimony, and also by circumstantial 
evidence. Blalock was not the first police officer encountered by the 
witness at the scene. The witness did not make any statements to the 
other police officers. Instead, she was held effectively to speak to an 
officer there for that purpose. Moreover, Moore’s statement was about 
past events. 
While the North Carolina courts relied on the fact that no questions 
were asked, the Davis Court, in a part of the opinion not responsive to 
the facts or issues in the cases at hand (but apparently intended to 
resolve cases like Forrest), stated that questions were not required at all. 
Thus, volunteered statements like those in Forrest are covered. 
Finally, the facts in Forrest suggested an effort at exact production 
of the witness’s words, albeit written in the officer’s notes rather than in 
a formal statement. Thus, the physical form of the statement probably 
would not have created a difficulty in treating the statement as 
testimonial. However, before Davis, some debate might have existed. 
Again, the “gratuitous” explanatory statement given in Davis eliminates 
the issue. Whether the statement is a signed witness statement or the 
statement is “embedded” in the memory or notes of the officer who 
received the statement is of no consequence if the statement was made 
in a non-emergency situation and the purpose of the questioning was to 
prove or establish a potential past crime. 
This examination of the facts of Forrest reveals, I believe, how much 
the Davis Court clarified in the “field investigation” context of 
investigatory witness/victim interviews, and how it has softened some of 
the most problematic edges of formality in such situations. This is not to 
deny that Davis left much to be resolved. Despite wide areas of 
uncertainty regarding the dividing line between nontestimonial and 
                                                                                                              
“responsibility . . . first to stand by at Mary Phillips school while we waited to 
determine if the [area] had been secured, meaning that . . . the victim had been 
removed to safety” and then to “go to the location and get that person and 
interview that person.” After police officers removed Defendant from the scene 
and the area was secure, Detective Blalock arrived and took the witness’ 
statement, which was later used at trial. 
State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
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testimonial statements in 911 calls and other emergency situations, 
Davis resolved, often rather clearly, an important class of cases—non-
emergency police investigatory interviews—and it put them within the 
protection of Crawford’s invigorated Confrontation Clause.103 
VII. SOFTENING FORMALISM—THE IMPRECISION OF THE TESTIMONIAL-
STATEMENT LABEL FOR THE ACTUAL COVERAGE OF THE NEW 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
In describing the common features of the statements in Crawford 
and Davis, Justice Scalia made the following statement: 
Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to police 
questioning, how potentially criminal events began and progressed. 
And both took place some time after the events described were over. 
Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute 
for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on 
direct examination; they are inherently testimonial.104 
I question whether the above statement actually describes 
testimonial statements. Rather, it is a description of statements that 
would more accurately be covered by different terminology. This is a 
description of a statement made out of court recounting past events, 
which was then used in court and had the same effect as testimony. 
These two individuals were not giving testimony when they talked to the 
officers. The officers were trying to establish or prove past events. This is 
a description of non-emergency, official-investigative statements 
regarding past criminal events.105 It is not testimony, and calling it 
testimony does not make it so. 
After Crawford and Davis, the Confrontation Clause covers both 
testimonial statements as described by Justice Thomas’s definition, plus 
the official investigative statements regarding past events covered by the 
holdings of those cases and the descriptive language of Davis. 
Justice Scalia has shown a willingness to reduce substantially the 
formality requirement of his Webster’s dictionary text as he has shifted 
                                               
103 See also State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830, 841–44 (N.C. 2005) (ruling that 
statement of victim to police officer describing the robbery and her attacker made in non-
emergency situation was nontestimonial, the court drawing a distinction between the 
initial gathering of information and the determination of whether a crime was actually 
committed, which it considered generally nontestimonial, and “structured questioning,” 
which follows this initial stage and was seen as testimonial). Lewis was remanded by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as well. Lewis v. North Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (granting 
certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding for further consideration in light of 
Davis). 
104 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. 
105 When one abstracts the Davis holding and its explanatory statements into a 
descriptive definition, one must wonder what the historical basis is for the developing 
doctrine that has these specific dimensions. The case is hard to make that the result is 
compelled by the historical and linguistic sources cited. 
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from a focus on the intent of the testifying witness to that of the 
investigative questioner. How this is any longer a definition or 
description of testimonial statements is far from clear to me. It is 
certainly not Noah Webster’s definition. However, whatever the 
definition should be labeled, it has become less formalistic than when 
Justice Thomas first formulated it in White, and it has shown some 
flexibility and some apparent attention to the function of such 
statements in two quite different historical environments.106 These are 
positive developments, which I hope will continue. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Future cases will tell us more about whether this process of 
softening formality and formalism will continue. In particular, when the 
statements move from those made to criminal investigative officers to 
others interested in establishing or proving past criminal events, we will 
again confront issues of formality and formalism. Davis was clearly a 
positive event in the development of the scope of new Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence. It pushed back wooden boundaries to provide 
coverage suggested by historical sources in a changed environment.  
As future cases test these boundaries further, part of what they will 
reveal is how flexible or rigid they are. Of immediate interest is the 
possible requirement suggested in Crawford that the statement must be 
made to a known government official, and the suggestion in Davis that 
the statement be made under circumstances where false statements may 
be criminally punished. We will also see whether categories are added to 
the current testimonial statements, which include affidavits, prior 
testimony, etc., as well as non-emergency, official-investigative state-
ments regarding past criminal events (statements in the field of the type 
made in the Hammon case). 
If the softening and expansion of the testimonial-statement 
definition stops at this point, a Confrontation Clause of substantial value 
will have been created. However, it will be incomplete and inadequate in 
                                               
106 The testimonial concept suggests a formalistic definition, but inherently it need 
not be so defined. Although Professor Richard Friedman uses the testimonial-statement 
terminology and argues forcefully for its merits, his conception is far more functional as 
reflected by the amicus definition in Crawford. Indeed, his statement during his 
introductory remarks at this symposium was expansively functional. He argued that the 
purpose of the testimonial-statement approach is to preserve the type of trial procedures 
that give primacy to live testimony given before the jury that is subject to confrontation. 
That definition does not lead to the embodiment of the testimonial-statement concept in 
the formality of the statement form or in a formulaic analysis. See Richard D. Friedman, 
Crawford and Davis: A Personal Reflection, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2006-2007). 
When I criticize the testimonial concept I should not be understood to be criticizing this 
quite different view, but rather the view that I observe in the formulation given the concept 
by the Court. Obviously, it is the Court’s formulation that decides cases. 
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coverage. We must await the answer given in future opinions because 
almost nothing in Crawford and Davis, either when viewed separately or 
together, compels or even indicates that the positive direction of Davis 
will continue. 
